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While recognising property in the human body would have its uses, there are objections to granting such rights
given the unique nature of  the body. One objection is that property serves individualistic and not
communitarian values and fails to capture the body’s relational interdependent nature. I contest this objection
as it takes an overly narrow view of  property as being ‘Blackstonian’ in character, eliding the diversity of
property institutions that actually exist. Thus, the usefulness of  property law in the protection and
management of  community resources and the manner in which property is often limited by non-property
interests that the law is accustomed to protecting have not been accounted for. I contend that property
facilitates cooperative human activity and could potentially provide useful tools for the protection of
individual and communal rights in the body. I further contend that, where property rights have tentatively
been recognised in human biomaterials, they are not strongly exclusive in character and are consistent with
property’s inclusive and communitarian nature in being limited to prevent public harm and by reference to
the non-property interests of  other persons and the community.
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1 Introduction
Whether the interests of  the person in their body and its parts and products should beprotected by the recognition of  property rights vesting in the source of  these
materials (whereby a person may acquire property rights in their own bodily materials), or
alternatively, through other non-property legal mechanisms, remains a highly contested area
of  debate.1 Leaving aside momentarily the objections to this approach, there are a number
of  advantages of  adopting the property paradigm in order to protect the rights and interests
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of  persons in their body.2 Of  particular usefulness to judges facing novel and difficult
questions relating to the control and use of  the body and its parts is that property provides
remedies in cases where none would otherwise be available.3 Granting such a strong right
as a property right to the source of  such materials could provide a valuable tool in
protecting the dignity and autonomy of  the person by enabling them to control how their
bodily products are used and would provide a valuable counterweight to commercial
interests that would seek to instrumentalise the body and its parts for private gain, without
recourse to or concern for the source of  those biomaterials.4
Nevertheless, there are concerns with treating the human body as property.5 There are
principled concerns; for example, that property would lead to the commodification of
human beings and their parts and this would constitute an affront to human dignity.6
There are also practical objections, one of  which states that allowing the source of  human
tissue a property right in it would unduly fetter medical research.7
There is a broader objection to the use of  property which I contest in this article. This
asserts that property models are largely underpinned by individualistic values and merely
protect exclusion and control. Under this objection, the adoption of  a property model to
regulate the uses of  the body and its parts serves to characterise it as ‘bounded and self-
contained’. This misrepresents the true nature of  the body which is inherently relational.8
In this article, I contend that this objection to adopting a property model for regulating
human biomaterials is rooted in the assumption that property is adequately described by
William Blackstone’s ownership model (recently rehabilitated as exclusion), ignoring the
fact that property is often much more limited and inclusive than that conceived by
Blackstone and his successors.
I also examine the recent work of  a number of  legal pluralists who contend that
property should be understood as a mode of  organising social relationships, that property
owners have not just rights but obligations towards other owners, non-owners and the
community as a whole.9 I show that the recognition of  property rights in human
biomaterials is developing more in accordance with this view of  property. Accordingly,
where property rights have been so recognised in human biomaterials, they have been
limited by the protection of  non-property interests in a way that would be predicted by
legal pluralists, but could not be accounted for by those who adhere to accounts of
property as an institution being synonymous with full-liberal ownership and exclusively
serving individualistic values.
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2 The objection: property serves individualistic values whereas the body 
is relational
A number of  commentators object to property in the body on the basis that it serves the
values underpinning autonomy and the market that are atomistic, self-focused and
competitive. These principles are at variance with the broader range of  values that we
should seek to promote when dealing with questions concerning the body, its parts and
products. Thus, property rights, it is claimed, would objectify the body as bounded and
self-contained when its true nature is in fact relational and interdependent. An
understanding of  the self  as individualised means personhood is then presented by
reference to abilities which are self-referential and emphasise independence, and the kinds
of  ethical values that are said to be advanced by individualised concepts of  the self  are
autonomy, freedom and liberty.10 Accordingly, there is a presumption that such freedoms
should not be interfered with unless sufficient justification can be produced. The role of
law becomes primarily to keep others out and leave the person free to carry on activities
of  their choosing as they wish.11
In allowing its owner to be the supreme agenda-setter in respect of  a resource,
property rights are seen to protect only one set of  legal interests: those of  control,
exclusion and transfer with proceedings rarely being brought on behalf  of  communal
interests.12 In this view, conceiving of  the body as property leads to the attitude that it is
a thing controlled by the self  with which one can do what one wants. Accordingly,
individuals should have control of  their bodies and body parts and no one else can have
ownership of  them.13 Furthermore, it is the individual who determines the appropriate
use of  body parts and they should be able to deal with them as they wish.14
This line of  criticism also asserts that the favouring of  individualistic interests
inherent in property institutions treats the body as atomised when its true nature is
relational. Bodies are ‘leaky’ in the sense that the meaning and understanding of  the self
is not easily captured by one concept or approach.15 This view of  the self  sees it as having
definition and moral value in its relation to others and our relationship with them. In
contrast to the role of  law in the individualised conception, which seeks to keep people
apart, the relational approach sees the purpose of  law as enabling good relationships and
caring relationships to thrive.16 This approach does not view the body as a controlled and
independent entity. Rather, it emphasises the interconnectedness and interdependence of
bodies. This connectedness is to other bodies, such as during pregnancy or through
genetics.17 Human dependence and interdependence are natural parts of  the human
condition through birth, aging, sickness and the need for companionship.18 This all
means that it is impossible to consider our bodies separate from other bodies. My body
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is not thus ‘mine’ in a straightforward manner, and the individualistic values of  control
and exclusion promoted by property can never fully capture it.
The fact that a variety of  forms of  property may exist does not overcome the
objection on this view of  property. While obviously not all types of  property are
unqualified, exclusive and individualistic, these attributes are the ‘starting presuppositions’
of  property.19 Thus, there is a presumption that absolute and unqualified ownership is the
norm. And, while proponents of  property point to its technical capacity to encompass
exceptions, qualifications and regulations to adapt it to a particular purpose, these must
be justified in each case as such limits deviate from the normal conception of  what
property is. So, property as a legal tool forces us to divert energy into constantly justifying
any limits on its absolute nature, as such limits are regarded as aberrant and contrary to
what property truly is.20 This view admits that a reformed and new conception of
property could be worked towards that would conceive of  property in relational terms.21
However, the prevailing norms of  property are currently unreformed and reflect
individualistic and market-driven values.22 Although the content of  property rights is
capable of  being limited to serve certain values, in such an environment presumptions
would favour granting a full suite of  property rights in human biomaterials and would
thus favour commodification, objectification, exploitation and alienation.23 In this
context, the power of  legal discourse to translate and replace complex ways of  describing
human relations into simple formulas is seen as particularly troublesome if  we are to
conceive of  the body as property. On this legal construct, it is feared that bodies would
only be viewed as related to each other as mere market commodities where matters such
as pain and desire are articulated as types of  property damage and consumer preference
and love reduced to only another type of  contract.24
One does not have to look far into mainstream property theory to find evidence that
the property paradigm promotes such values. Blackstone described the right of  property
as ‘that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external
things of  the world, in total exclusion of  the rights of  any other individual in the
universe’.25 Blackstone thus asserted that property was an absolute right vested in the
individual by natural law in contrast to the Lockean notion that such rights were
dependent on society’s recognition that the owner had mixed his labour with the property
in some way.26 Since owners are free to use their property as they wish, we naturally
presume that the owner has the fullest amount of  powers to use, control, manage and
alienate the property, what I will call ‘full-liberal ownership’.27
Blackstone’s ‘ownership’ model has been modernised by those commentators who
reject the ‘bundle of  rights’ picture of  property, discussed below, and adopt an exclusion
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or boundary approach whereby the essence of  property is constituted by the power to
exclude all others from the object owned.28 It is not then difficult to regard property as
promoting individualistic values whereby, by definition, I may exclude the whole world
from the resources over which I have dominion, and I may make such use of  them as I
like without regard for others. It is precisely because of  this conception of  property
institutions as leading to separation, atomisation and selfishness in the use of  resources
that the appropriateness of  the property paradigm being applied to human bodies is
challenged.29
3 The limits of absolutist and exclusivist accounts of property
Although undoubtedly influential, the ‘ownership’ model of  property overestimates the
extent to which property interests are exclusive and independent of  one another and
ignores property’s relational nature. To characterise property as absolute and exclusive
ignores the features of  property that facilitate human cooperation and altruism. Indeed,
Blackstone accepted that absolute rights may be curtailed by positive law for the blessings
of  civilised society.30 And, notwithstanding the natural law basis of  these rights, he
acknowledged the functional justifications for property rights within this framework.31
The individual is not protected from all government action, only government action that
is arbitrary. Indeed, the government in Blackstone’s time exercised extensive powers of
regulation.32 Even in colonial America, where property rights were frequently described
in absolutist terms in political rhetoric, these rights were subject to significant regulation
and expropriation and property was understood by the colonists as being limited.33
While property rights have never been absolute, the rhetoric of  absolutism has
persisted in political and legal discourse.34 This creates a difficulty in that this image of
property served to obscure the distinctions between different types of  property, for
example that the family home deserves a significant degree of  legal protection does not
mean that a developer’s commercial property deserves the same level of  protection.35
This ‘myth of  property’ emphasises property rights as providing autonomy in the form
of  independence and this necessarily limits voluntary obligations to others.36
A further weakness of  these accounts is that exclusion theorists believe the concept of
property concerns only relations between owners and non-owners. They are, as one
commentator notes, only concerned with the ‘external life’ of  property.37 However, the
internal life of  property, that is the relationships between property stakeholders, is often
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highly significant to property doctrinally.38 Very significant rules regulate, for example, the
rights of  communities, neighbours, co-owners and families; providing structure for what
are cooperative as opposed to competitive relationships. As Carol Rose has observed, we




Equal and correlative rights
Reasonable Use.39
Most of  these terms are part of  the layperson’s understanding of  property, and we should
not allow the mythology of  property – exclusiveness, boundedness and selfishness – to
obscure the fact that cooperation and attentiveness to others are essential features of  any
property law regime.40 This ‘mythology of  property’, based as it is on an understanding
of  property as an antisocial institution, has been used to assert the inappropriateness of
applying the language of  property to resolve disputes involving intimate human
relations.41 Nonetheless, while intimate human relationships may be characterised by
sharing, nurturing and attentiveness to needs, property and entitlement are inseparable
from these features of  these relationships.42 Indeed, property may be implicit in
determining ‘who gets what’ in the most intimate of  settings.43 On even a cursory
examination of  how property works, it becomes clear that it is fanciful to regard all its
forms as controlled, atomised and independent entities. To identify all property in such
terms is to mistake rhetoric for reality and cast to the margins a considerable swathe of
property law doctrine that is relational, governing rights between owners (nuisance,
easements), between owners and non-owners (licences, public accommodations), in
intimate settings (family property), as well as doctrine that ensures the management of
property for the benefit of  others, or indeed its management in the interests of  the public
as a whole (private and charitable trusts).
4 Alternative accounts of property: limited, inclusive and communitarian
4.1 PROPERTY AS INCLUSION
In the view of  certain legal pluralists, private law scholars have attempted to provide
‘monist’ accounts of  private law where broad normative accounts suggest that one
regulative principle guides the doctrines of  complex legal fields. In relation to property,
exclusion has been placed at its core by theorists such as Thomas Merrill and Henry
Smith and other manifestations of  property are pushed to the periphery.44 Structural
pluralists such as Hanoch Dagan note the tendency for distinct institutions to develop in
property law, and the rules for each institution are context-specific with differing rules
expressing differing normative commitments in different categories of  human
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 70(3)
38   Ibid 1855.
39   C M Rose, ‘Rhetoric and Romance: A Comment on Spouses and Strangers’ (1994) 82 Georgetown Law
Journal 2409, 2410. 
40   Ibid. The development of  ‘social norms’ theory around property rights heavily emphasises cooperative
aspects of  neighbourhood relations; R C Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbours Settle Disputes (Harvard
University Press1991).
41   Regan (n 36). 
42   Rose (n 39).
43   Ibid.
44   Merrill (n 28); Merrill and Smith (n 28); H Dagan, ‘Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law’ (2012) 112
Columbia Law Review 1409, 1410. 
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situation.45 In this account, each property institution, is ‘designed to match the specific
balance of  values suited to the specific social context’ (family, business, etc.).46 Not only
does conceptualising property as the right to exclude undermine the importance of  the
internal life of  property, it obscures the fact that inclusion is often an important feature
of  it.47 For example, the concept of  fair use in copyright law, much of  landlord and
tenant law and the law of  public accommodations involve non-owners’ rights of  entry
that are inherent in property law.48 On this view of  property, while owners have some
rights to exclude others, other values play a crucial role in shaping property institutions
and property can and does serve commitments to personhood, desert, aggregate welfare
and social responsibility.49 The particular configuration of  differing entitlements for
differing property institutions is not arbitrary or random, but determined by the unique
balance of  values characterising the property institution. Reshaping property institutions
is an on-going process but the ability to repackage rights as envisaged by the Honoré-
Hohfeld conception of  property allows judges to develop existing property forms while
remaining sensitive to social context.50
Indeed, the ownership model fails to acknowledge the frequent conflict between the
exercise of  property rights and non-property rights. Property rights are not the only rights
that matter and are certainly not the only rights protected by the legal system.51 Nor
should one assume that property rights will prevail in a conflict with personal rights, and
conflicts between different legally protected interests means that regulation and limits on
private property are far more pervasive than one might assume.52 Of  particular relevance
here is the fact that certain resources may be constitutive of  a person’s identity resulting
in a reconfiguration of  property entitlements so that the law vindicates a person’s control
of  their constitutive resources. Margaret Radin supports limiting owners’ exclusionary
rights in order to protect the personhood interests of  others in their property. For
example, she espouses residential rent control protection for tenants whose residence is
their home and thus constitutive of  their person.53 The commodification of  objects
constitutive of  personhood is of  particular concern, and she contends that there are
strong arguments for regarding certain objects, such as body parts, sex and children to
either be prohibited from sale (market-inalienable) or subject to regulation which limits
commodification and protects personhood (limited market-inalienability).54
Thus, to be granted property in a valuable resource is not to be granted ‘sole and
despotic dominion’ over it since exclusionary rights will be pockmarked with exceptions
depending on the existence of  other interests in the resource which the law is accustomed
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46   Dagan (n 44) 1411.
47   Dagan (n 45) 29. 
48   J W Singer, ‘No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property’ (1995) 90 Northwestern
University Law Review 1283.
49   Dagan (n 45) 29–30.
50   A M Honoré, ‘Ownership’ in A G Guest (ed), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Clarendon Press 1961) 107, 112–
14. W N Hohfeld, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1913) 23 Yale
Law Journal 16; Dagan (n 45) 30.
51   J W Singer, Entitlement: The Paradoxes of  Property (Yale University Press 2000) 7.
52   Ibid. 
53   M J Radin, ‘Residential Rent Control’ (1986) 15 Philosophy and Public Affairs 350.
54   M J Radin, ‘Market-inalienability’ (1987) 100 Harvard Law Journal 1849.
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to protecting.55 For example, the availability of  the trespass remedy has been limited in
order to protect such non-property interests as freedom of  speech,56 the welfare of
migrant workers,57 and the right to peacefully picket.58 A privilege which prevents liability
in trespass has been granted by the courts if  a defendant has furthered an interest of  such
societal importance as to be entitled to protection.59 The abusive exercise of  rights can
be curtailed in circumstances where the landowner has suffered a mere legal and not
actual injury.60 It is also well established that landowners may not arbitrarily exclude
individuals from private land where this land has been opened up to the public at large by
the landowner.61 The common law right to exclude can be said to be substantially
qualified by a competing common law right of  reasonable access to public places.62
The law is clearly accustomed to protecting bodily rights, utilising a diversity of  legal
doctrines such as privacy, the criminal law and torts. If  we accept Dagan’s view that
property develops distinct institutions with different rules depending on context, there
is no reason to doubt that a body-as-property institution would reflect a unique
commitment to vindicating the range of  values in the body that the law has traditionally
protected. Given the unique nature of  the body, this property institution would balance
the unique interests and values that the individual and the community have in the
human body.
4.2 PROPERTY SERVES COMMUNITARIAN VALUES
It is inaccurate to describe property in all its forms as merely serving self-interested and
individualistic values, and a further misdescription to assert that property cannot capture
the relational aspects of  the body: property institutions can and do facilitate cooperative
relationships between individuals, and between the individual and the community.
Undoubtedly, there are property institutions that are shaped along Blackstonian lines
being atomistic and competitive, but in other areas property law does not allow these
norms to infiltrate other social spheres and thus property relations mediate some of  the
most cooperative areas of  human interaction.63 Entitlement sacrifices required by the
law, such as restrictions on rights by eminent domain and nuisance, and use sacrifices, so
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55   Singer gives the example of  public accommodations law which limits the ability of  owners of  businesses open
to the public to exclude persons from their property on an invidious basis such as race: Singer (n 51) 72–75.
56   Marsh v Alabama (1946) 326 US 501 (striking down a law against distributing religious literature in a company-
owned town without the permission of  the landowner).
57   State v Shack (1971) 58 NJ 297 (where the conviction of  the defendants for trespass for entering onto private
lands to aid migrant farmworkers was overturned as being beyond the reach of  the trespass statute); cf.
Harrison v Carswell [1976] 2 SCR 200 (where lawful picketers were convicted of  trespass for picketing at a
shopping centre). 
58   Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v Logan Valley Pizza Inc 308, 88S Ct 1601, 20 L Ed 2d 603, (where
the right to picket peacefully in a privately owned shopping centre was upheld); see also Schwarz-Torrance
Investment Corp v Bakery and Confectionary Workers Union, 61 Cal 2d 766, 40 Cal Rptr 233, 394 P 2d 921 (Sup, Ct
1964) 380 US 906, 85 S Ct 888, 13 L Ed 2d 794 (1964).
59   Per Laskin CJ, dissenting, in Harrison v Carswell [1976] 2 SCR 200, 209–11.
60   H C Gutteridge, ‘Abuse of  Rights’ (1935) 5 Cambridge Law Journal 22. 
61   Singer (n 48); N F Arterburn, ‘The Origin and First Test of  Public Calling’ (1927) 75 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register 411.
62   Per Pashman J in Uston v Resorts International Hotel, Inc 445 A2d 370, 374 (NJ 1982) (where a casino was held
to have no power of  exclusion of  a casino patron on the basis that he was ‘card-counting’ as this did not
violate any casino rules). See also Brooks v Chicago Downs Association 791 F 2d 512 at 519 (1986) and Marzocca v
Ferone 93 NJ 509, 461 A2d 1133 (1983) which suggest that the courts will be particularly concerned to prevent
arbitrary exclusions where the normal workings of  the market fail to prevent such excesses. 
63   Dagan (n 45) 30.
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as to ensure the historic preservation of  buildings and environmental protection, are
illustrative of  the view that private property owners owe duties to the community 
at large.64
Property scholarship concerning the environment is of  particular interest to those
concerned with questions as to the propertisation of  the body, as it has recognised that
prevailing theories of  property are incompatible with two essential features of
environmentalism: the interconnectedness of  people and their environment and the
importance of  the unique characteristics of  each object.65 Rather than rejecting property
as a means of  achieving environmental goals, they seek for a new metaphor that can
better account for human–human relationships, human–object relationships and the
importance of  the unique characteristics of  an object when defining the nature of  the
rights and interests in it.66 When all property is regarded as a commodity and seen merely
as an instrumental tool to increase value, the environment suffers and a rebalancing of
property law is required with the recognition of  certain lands as a separate legal category
where their undeveloped status can be protected.67
The creation of  such a separate category in property law would clearly be of  interest
to those who share the Kantian concern that human beings should never be used solely
as a means only to an end, as being human is always an end in itself.68 Such a theoretical
development would merely reflect that there are many categories of  things, be they
wilderness lands or human ova, that are not appropriately categorised as Blackstonian
property, but would benefit from being included in the property system if  it could be
tailored to protect these unique objects.
Were this otherwise, and if  the nature of  property were indeed absolute, the state
would be unable to adjust property rights to the public good by regulation without the
payment of  compensation in every case. Effectively, then, the government would only be
able to regulate by purchase, effectively rendering regulation of  the use of  land
impossible.69 In the USA, where attachment to the idea of  property as Blackstonian,
absolute and fundamental to individual liberty is at its strongest, the lawful exercise of  the
‘police power’ by government may diminish the value of  private land without any duty to
pay compensation.70 Where the government effects a ‘taking’ of  property for public use,
this is subject to a constitutional requirement that ‘just compensation’ be paid to the
owner. Nonetheless, a considerable range of  activities have been held not to be such a
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67   J G Sprankling, ‘The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law’ (1996) University of  Chicago Law
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taking,  including zoning ordinances,71 the abatement of  nuisance,72 conservation,73 the
regulation of  business,74 public navigation rights,75 and the health and safety of  the
community.76 A ‘bewildering array of  rules’ has developed to determine which losses are
compensable takings and which are not.77 If  property’s nature were truly absolute, a
traditional and formal legal test would have yielded consistency and precision in how
these cases were decided, but this has not been the case.78
Indeed, at every stage of  history in the Western world individuals risked having their
property taken from them by the state.79 And A W B Simpson characterises Blackstone’s
description of  property (‘So great, moreover, is the regard of  the law for private property,
that it will not authorize the least violation of  it; no not even for the general good of  the
whole community.’)80 as ‘possibly misleading’ since there probably existed in Blackstone’s
time Crown powers to take property without parliamentary approval.81 Indeed, in English
law there is no similar right to compensation for regulatory takings, as is mandated in US
constitutional jurisprudence.82 Furthermore, Article 1 of  the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) provides that no one shall be deprived of  their possessions
‘except in the public interest’, a seemingly broader range of  justifiable expropriations than
contemplated in the US Constitution where it is the ‘public use’ that provides the
justification.83
5 Property in the body
5. 1 THE BODY AND LIMITED OWNERSHIP RIGHTS
Recent debate regarding the appropriate legal category to assign to the body and its parts
has focused on whether these materials should be the subject of  a property or a statutory
regime.84 In reality, if  a property regime were adopted, statutes would be needed to
regulate these property rights so the claim for a property regime is not an exclusive one.85
It is, of  course, possible to reject a property approach and rely solely on statutory
regulation, but there are disadvantages to this approach. In particular, it is impossible to
anticipate all possible legal disputes that will arise when designing a statutory scheme and
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there are dangers that lacunae will be left by any such regulation. As human biomaterials
increase in value and advances in technology create new contexts in which such value
rises, there is likely to be an increase in the number of  and complexity of  disputes
involving human tissue.86 The advantage of  a broad legal category like property is that it
allows legal rules to be expressed at a high level of  generality, greatly reducing the
administrative costs of  amending and interpreting the law. Laws that do not treat a thing
as part of  a broader class can be described as sui generis. Such a specialist regime risks
creating regulatory gaps and also imposing high administrative costs upon lawyers and the
public.87 There is also the danger in an area such as biotechnology that a sui generis regime
might be quickly overtaken by technological change to the extent that the regime is based
on assumptions that are no longer valid, creating ‘regulatory disconnection’: i.e. where the
law is still applicable and there is no legal disconnection, but it may not be appropriate to
apply it to this new technology creating regulatory disconnection 88
Proponents of  a property regime point to the fact that it would make available pre-
existing remedies in novel disputes where there would be none otherwise.89 As noted,
opponents point to the dangers that the body and the person who inhabits it will be
devalued by the application of  a property regime to human biomaterials, potentially
leading to objectification, commodification, fragmentation and expropriation of  the body
and its parts by the state.90 Thus, treating the body as property is rejected on the grounds
that it will lead to practices that are considered by many to be objectionable, such as the
sale of  organs, the right to sell oneself  into slavery and the right to sell sexual services.91
Such fears are as a result of  the tendency to conflate more limited forms of  property with
full ownership and to consider all forms of  property as equating with roughly the same
set of  rights.92
If, however, we regard property as it is often regarded both judicially and
academically,93 in terms of  Antony Honoré’s standard incidents of  ownership, property
is a series of  rights (as well as some duties and restrictions), such as the right to possess,
the right to use, the right to manage, the right to transmissibility, and the right to derive
income from the thing.94 According to Honoré, for full ownership in a thing to be
recognised, one must hold most of  these incidents with regard to the object of  property.
As with games, there is no single characteristic that all types of  property share: rather,
there is a network of  overlapping and criss-crossing similarities.95 Furthermore, these
incidents can be further characterised as being those which allow the owner to control the
uses to which the property is put, and those allowing him or her to derive income from
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the thing. The existence of  certain incidents does not imply the existence of  others – e.g.
I may have the power to use something but not have the power to sell it. While none of
the standard incidents is necessary for ownership to be present, it is certainly possible for
all of  these incidents to vest in the owner, sometimes referred to as ‘full-liberal
ownership’.96 However, there are many forms of  property which are more limited as
some of  the standard incidents are not present; for instance, an owner may have control
rights but not income rights.97 Thus, the fact that I have the right to control a thing (such
as my body) does not automatically imply that I have the right to sell it, or any part of  it.
Indeed, Douglas and Goold maintain that commercialisation and exploitation are not
inevitable consequences of  recognising property in the body as the law of  property does
not confer a right to use nor restrict an owner’s liberty to use a thing.98 Thus, in a
technical legal sense at least, the concept of  property does not inevitably lead towards any
of  the feared outcomes since any of  the standard incidents can be absent from the bundle
of  rights. Nonetheless, limited forms of  property still meet the definition of  full-liberal
ownership in Honoré’s scheme as long as most of  these incidents are present, allowing
flexibility in how we design property regimes.99 Recent legal decisions have demonstrated
a cautious move towards explicit recognition of  some property rights in biomaterials
vesting in their source, but this recognition has been of  limited property rights and has
not included income rights.100 The transfer of  rights may also be restricted so as to
protect the non-property interests of  the individual and society, and questions as to what
parts of  myself  I may sell or gift, and to whom, are highly contested areas of  academic
inquiry and no consensus has developed as to what a person may do with their blood,101
organs,102 and sperm and ova,103 both before and after death.104 Implicit in these debates
is that the right to fragment the body can be limited, and the extent of  such limitations is
where the contest lies.105 Such limited rights are consistent with a property approach as
most commentators who advocate this approach to body parts do not argue for full-
liberal ownership by the person of  their bodies, i.e. they acknowledge that the ‘owner’ will
not enjoy the fullest set of  rights possible on the ownership spectrum. For instance,
Quigley contends that having self-ownership consists in having most of  the elements of
ownership set down by Honoré and given inter alia that we have use and control of  our
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 70(3)
96   J W Harris, ‘Who Owns My Body’ (1996) Oxford Journal of  Legal Studies 55. 
97   Professor Harris describes such a limited form of  ownership as ‘mere property’: Harris (n 6) 28, 360–61
98   As, in their view, the right to use is not a property right but a liberty and would exist irrespective of  whether
or not property rights were recognised in respect of  human biomaterials: S Douglas and I Goold, ‘Property
in Human Biomaterials: A New Methodology (2016) 75(3) Cambridge Law Journal 478, 490–91. 
99   Quigley (n 91).
100  Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust [2010] QB 1; Holdich v Lothian Health Board [2013] CSOH 197; Hecht v
Superior Court (Kane) (n 89).
101  R M Titmuss, The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy (Allen & Unwin 1970).
102  A J Cronin and D Price, ‘Directed Organ Donation: Is the Donor the Owner?’ (2008) 3 Clinical Ethics 127;
Nwabueze (89); J S Taylor, Stakes and Kidneys: Why Markets in Human Body Parts are Morally Imperative (Routledge
2017).
103  R P Jansen, ‘Sperm and Ova as Property’ (1985) Journal of  Medical Ethics 123; J Wall, ‘The Trespasses of
Property Law'’ (2013) Journal of  Medical Ethics 1; J A Robertson, ‘Egg Freezing and Egg Banking:
Empowerment and Alienation in Assisted Reproduction’ (2014) Journal of  Law and the Biosciences 113.
104  Hecht v Superior Court (1993) 16 Cal App 4th 636; T C Voo and S Holm ‘Organs as Inheritable Property’ (2013)
40 Journal of  Medical Ethics 57. 
105  Douglas and Goold correctly caution against confusing normative questions as to whether property can or
should be recognised in human biomaterials and determining the content of  those rights and how they may
be transferred: S Douglas and I Goold (n 98). 
300
bodies, we can be said to own them.106 While J W Harris states that every person ought
to be considered the owner of  his or her separated body parts, he believes that this right
is limited to use and control rights and does not carry transmission powers.107
Regarding property as equivalent to the full spectrum of  ownership rights has resulted
in alarmist assumptions that, for example, endorsing property rights in the body is
tantamount to endorsing a right to sell a body part at any time for cash, or rendering
valuable body parts subject to eminent domain.108 A more realistic understanding of  the
richness and diversity of  property rights leads instead to an appreciation of  the variety of
possible property regimes in human biological materials.109 Property has always been
limited by the interests and rights of  others, both owners and non-owners, and it is not
fanciful to speculate that a property institution governing the body would be configured
in such a way as to serve a plurality of  commitments; in particular those non-property
interests, identified by commentators such as Dagan, Joseph Singer and Radin, of
personhood, aggregate welfare and social responsibility.110
In the limited ways in which the law currently recognises property in the body – in
relation to human gametes, corpses and transplantable organs – the development of  the
law lends support to this view that property rights in the body will be limited rights, with
a reconfiguration of  an owner’s rights if  they are found to conflict with the rights of  non-
owners. Where property rights have been recognised or at least argued for in human body
parts, their extent has been attenuated by the recognition that a grant of  full-liberal
ownership would negatively impact upon other interests that the law is accustomed to
protecting. The trend where such an interest is identified is thus away from, and not
towards, granting full-liberal ownership of  body parts given the range of  other interests
such ownership rights potentially conflict with.
Human gametes are of  note here given the variety of  sensitive interests they can
implicate. This stems from their potential for the creation of  human life: i.e. they have
genetic information in readily usable form.111 Furthermore, this potential use can be
preserved for many years since the technology now exists to freeze such materials ex vivo.
There have followed disputes in the courts about who can control and use such materials
after the death of  the testator, as well as whether the loss or destruction of  these samples
as a result of  breach of  duty is compensable.112 And, while the courts have recognised
sperm as property in a number of  cases, nowhere has full-liberal ownership been
expressly granted to the samples’ owner. Indeed, to the extent that frozen sperm samples
can be described as property, such rights are severely restricted by detailed statutory
regulation.113 Rights in gametes have been limited in other ways in response to a
developing understanding of  how granting unlimited rights of  disposal in them (i.e. the
right to transfer them anonymously) may harm future offspring. Until recently, seeking to
know one’s genetic origins only concerned a small group of  people. With recent advances
in artificial reproduction and also the increase in the number of  non-traditional families,
this group has quickly expanded, as there are many ways a child can be conceived and
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raised in the modern world.114 In the past, it was presumed that donor-conceived people
were best served not knowing the circumstances of  their conception.115 Only recently has
this paternalistic approach been superseded and the interest in knowing one’s biological
parents is now phrased in terms of  a ‘right to know’. This change of  attitude came as a
result of  personal accounts and small-scale studies that illuminated the views of  donor-
conceived people.116 A number of  consistent themes were revealed; early telling was
better than late telling; where the information about the individual’s conception was
revealed later in life the donor-conceived person may experience negative feelings about
the concealment (‘It’s not the conception, it’s the deception that’s the problem.’); donor-
conceived persons expressed an interest in knowing their donor personally, as well as in
identifying and locating any half-siblings that might exist; finally, lack of  information
about the donor was a source of  deep concern and frustration and of  problems with
identity for many donor-conceived people.117 The right to know one’s origins is a feature
of  the broader right to ascertain and preserve one’s identity, and human rights law has in
recent times been called in aid of  these claims. Article 8 of  the ECHR protects the right
to private and family life, and the right to know one’s origins has been held to be included
in the privacy guarantee by the European Court of  Human Rights (ECtHR).118 The
recent change of  attitudes towards the right to know one’s origins has been reflected in
the case law of  the ECtHR. The margin of  appreciation was formerly so broad that the
court upheld absolute secrecy as to the identity of  a parent as permitted in French law.119
In subsequent cases, however, the margin has narrowed considerably and the court now
considers that this right to know one’s identity and origins belongs to the inner core of
the right to respect for one’s private life as guaranteed by Article 8. In cases where this
right is concerned, the court will now examine the state’s balancing of  rights with close
scrutiny.120 In addition to these protections derived from Article 8 of  the ECHR,
Article 8 of  the Convention on the Rights of  the Child expressly guarantees identity
rights and Articles 17 and 18 of  the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
guarantees the right to privacy and right to birth registration, from which the right to
know one’s origins can be derived implicitly.121 This growing legal recognition of  the
fundamental importance of  the right to know one’s genetic parents in human rights law
has led to numerous jurisdictions prohibiting or curtailing anonymous gamete
donation.122 For instance, the UK, New Zealand, the Australian State of  Victoria, British
Columbia as well as a number of  mainland European countries have banned anonymous
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donation of  gametes, and donors must now be identifiable to their genetic offspring.123
If  one regards, as many do, sperm and eggs as property, such regulatory requirements
represent a restriction on alienation enacted to secure the non-property interests of  any
future offspring. One may still transfer ownership (by transferring possession and the
right to control and use) of  the sperm sample to the Assisted Reproductive Technology
clinic or donee, but there is a limit on such alienability in that it can no longer be
anonymous.
A similar approach is evident in regard to common law quasi-property rights that the
next-of-kin have over their relative’s dead body.124 Although at common law, there is
traditionally ‘no property’ in a corpse, the law recognised a sort of  quasi-property
whereby they may be, indeed are, under a duty to take possession of  a corpse for the
purposes of  burial, and the law would protect against such an interference.125 Thus, the
entitlement to possession of  the corpse is severely attenuated by non-property interests:
both of  the deceased and the wider community.126 Granting the deceased a proper
funeral is in accordance with human dignity, while public health requires the prompt
disposal of  the remains so as the living are not endangered by the spread of  disease.127
The ongoing debate over the status of  transplantable organs also illustrates the
powerful reasons for limiting property rights in them. Organs aren’t fully property, as they
cannot be sold due to concerns about commodification.128 While they may be gifted,
there are restrictions on this power that echo public accommodations cases where certain
facilities, both public and private, must not discriminate on the basis of  such matters as
race, religion or national origin.129 Indeed, concerns as to controversial conditions
relating to age, race or gender being attached to conditional donations has led to their
blanket prohibition in the UK.130 Once it was clear that a power to attach conditions to
donated organs could lead to interference with rights that the law has customarily
protected – i.e. discrimination on prohibited grounds – policymakers acted quickly to
limit the powers of  the donor in gifting their organs.131
Thus, it can be seen that property institutions in human tissue are beginning to
develop in ways that would be predicted by Dagan rather than Blackstone, being limited
in response to potential harms caused to the non-property interests of  persons other than
the owner.
5.2 THE LANGUAGE OF PROPERTY
There is a more nuanced objection to recognising a property regime in the body. This
states that in applying the language of  property and the market to the body, this rhetoric
will have a detrimental effect upon important values and reduce the body to a fungible
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commodity whose only value is its exchange value on the market.132 This objection is
rooted in the fact that language and how we use it has the power to affect perceptions and
shape our view as to what is important in life.133 Donna Dickenson contends that, once
the body is viewed as a full-fledged commodity, it will be subject to a multitude of  abuses
such as the trading and trafficking of  organs, the exploitation of  sperm and egg donors
by unscrupulous fertility clinics (what she terms ‘baby shopping’), or the taking of  organs,
tissue and indeed bones from the dead without the necessary consent of  the deceased or
their family.134
The familiar counterargument to this, as set out above, is that property is often limited
and we should not conflate all types of  property with Blackstonian property. Nonetheless,
the language used by legal regulations will not just be used by lawyers but also medical
professionals, philosophers and the public at large. Some commentators contend that,
while lawyers may understand that such terminology has a technical meaning, the
subtleties and nuances of  property institutions will not be clear to others. As language has
a power of  its own, they fear that the use of  property language will serve to objectify and
commercialise people.135 Thus, they are not attuned to the complexity of  the relational
model of  the bundle of  sticks, and describing the body as property would influence
policymakers and the public to think of  the body in terms leading to objectification and
commercialisation.136
This objection gives too little credit to non-lawyers’ intuitions about the differing
meanings of  property. As Professor Harris notes, we frequently invoke what he describes
as ‘body-ownership rhetoric’ to forcefully assert our right to use our bodies as we wish,
but this analogy to property in resources is not meant to be taken literally.137 Law and
social norms recognise something close to full-liberal ownership in resources, but
someone invoking body-ownership rhetorically is not committed to claiming the full
range of  use rights, income rights and transmission powers over their bodies.138 One does
not have to be a lawyer to understand that a reference to ‘my body’ means something
somewhat different than ‘my pen’ or ‘my car’, even if  the rhetoric of  ownership is the
same.139
Indeed, there is empirical research in relation to organ donation that suggests the
language of  commodification is far too simple to capture everyday intuitions about the
body.140 Participants demonstrated a plurality of  attitudes towards the body; namely, the
body as a mechanical object, the body as part of  a higher order embodying the self, and
the body as a hierarchy of  organs constitutive of  the self. In the focus groups, the authors
noted that the idea of  bodily self-determination – i.e. the right of  a person to do what
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they wished with their body and its parts – was expressed in terms of  ownership language.
At first blush, this seemed to equate the human body with forms of  private property
where one has full-liberal ownership, but on closer examination the adoption of  the
language of  ownership did not imply approval of  commercialisation, which some viewed
as impeding self-determination in corrupting a person’s proper will.141 Thus, the intuitive
and absolutist image of  property that Thomas Grey suggests the layman holds (‘to be able
to use as one wishes, to sell it, give it away, leave it idle, or destroy it’) does not necessarily
hold true for the body.142 It is also worth noting that many of  the abuses that Dickenson
fears will be exacerbated by recognising property in the body have occurred throughout
history; Burke and Hare would likely have been little troubled that the law recognised ‘no
property’ in the body at the time they were carrying out their crimes.143
In addition, it cannot be assumed that the intrinsic value of  certain goods will
necessarily be diminished by assigning them a value in the market.144 Markets in goods
are not limited to fungible commodities such as shares and negotiable instruments, but
also things whose value cannot be fully captured in monetary terms such as artworks, rare
musical instruments, and tickets to highly anticipated sporting events. Such items clearly
have non-economic value to their owners and experience in exchanging such non-
fungible goods suggests that market language would necessarily lead to us forgetting the
non-economic value of  human tissue and organs.145 Of  course, law has an expressive
function and when evaluating a legal rule we may question whether it appropriately values
an event, group or practice.146 If  the law inappropriately values something it may tilt
social norms in the wrong direction. However, law sometimes has negligible value effect
on social norms. Cass Sunstein contends that legal provisions for market exchange of
intrinsic goods which are valued for reasons other than use need not affect social
valuations of  their intrinsic worth.147 While there is a lack of  evidence that human beings
cannot comprehend the diverse ways in which the human body and its parts are valued,
there are many examples, some set out above, of  markets in goods whose value is not
limited to their commercial use.148 In light of  the above, the current practice of
permitting numerous transfers of  property rights and market exchanges to continue,
while limiting the application of  the language of  property and markets to such exchanges,
must be called into question as leading to unscrutinised market activity.149 For example,
donations of  tissue and organs are often framed in the language of  gift, obscuring the
fact that no property can vest in the source of  such materials. Such altruistic (and thus
non-market) discourse also obscures the fact that ‘gifted’ human tissue is, as a matter of
course, exploited and commercialised for private gain by medical researchers, further
damaging the relationship of  trust between medical professionals and the public.150
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5.3 PROPERTY CAN PROTECT SOCIAL AND COMMUNITY INTERESTS IN THE BODY
A further difficulty with regarding property as always synonymous with full-liberal
ownership is that this simplification conflates all types of  property with private property:
i.e. it ignores the types of  property that are communal. At times, one would be forgiven
for forgetting that private property is but one factor, albeit a major one, in the overall
system of  resource management. But, even in capitalist economies, many valuable
resources are not in private ownership, with other forms of  property ranging from open
access resources to differing forms of  limited commons arrangements such as a pasture
shared by villagers or a common area in a condominium, all of  which have their own
governing rules.151
Some commentators contend that human bodily materials should be considered as
belonging to the community rather than the individual. For instance, Radhika Rao
considers that the dead, and by extension their organs, might constitute communal
property. Any individual rights thus granted over the material would be by way of
stewardship and would have to be exercised for the benefit of  the entire community,
something akin to the public trust.152 Professor Harris contends that genetic information
should belong to the entire community,153 and there are those who argue that indigenous
people’s genetic heritage should be protected by some form of  ownership.154 One could,
of  course, opt to protect such communal and public interests in these materials by legal
means other than property. Nevertheless, to dismiss property in favour of  statutory
regulation is to lose the benefit of  pre-existing legal tools for protecting and managing
communal interests in valuable resources where regulations are not working.
For example, when one considers the ethical difficulties in securing consent to the
future use of  one’s tissue in research, property may provide an answer. It may be difficult,
if  not impossible, to foresee the types of  research that the tissue will be utilised for in the
future. The researcher must then decide to seek a fresh consent in every case, an
enormously costly and impractical exercise, or, as became the practice, secure a broad and
effectively open-ended consent to any future use of  the tissue at the time of  its
donation.155 The donor’s interests in the use of  their material is supposed to be protected
by this consent, but as the breadth of  these consents has increased so too have ethical
questions as to how meaningful they really are.156 There is a further difficulty with this
regime. By researchers encouraging donation of  such material (and employing the
language of  gift) and then excluding donors from any meaningful input into what is done
with them and the type of  research they are used for, public trust in the process is
undermined.157
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Until recently, scholarship on the governance of  biobanks ignored property and
focused on consent, Institutional Review Boards and privacy.158 Rather than tinkering with
the regulatory requirements, one of  the most sensible solutions advocates that biobanks
be based on a new form of  agreement between the medical institution, the researcher and
the donor community. These agreements would utilise property law to vindicate the donor
community’s interests by adopting the charitable trust model.159 A charitable trust with the
public as the ultimate beneficiary fully accords with altruistic expectations when gifting
tissue, and the donor group can act in an advisory capacity in the governance of  the trust.
Under the trust agreement, the donor/settlor formally transfers any property interest in his
or her tissue to the trust and appoints a trustee of  the property who then has a duty to
manage the material for the benefit of  an identified beneficiary, which in this case would
be the general public.160 The adoption of  a trust model has the potential to encourage
donor participation in research governance, as well as encourage research that will benefit
the public.161 For example, UK Biobank has adopted a variation of  this model and has
been established as a non-profit entity with a charitable purpose: to build a major resource
that can support medical research aimed at the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of
illness throughout society. Its Board of  Directors is obligated under UK charity law to
manage the organisation in accordance with this charitable purpose.162 Although the
proper governance arrangements for biobanks is still hotly contested in the literature, the
adoption of  a charitable model of  institutional governance allows for a form of
stewardship that honours the charitable intent of  the donors, protects against insolvency,
promotes research and respects the dignitary interest of  donors.163 Thus, property law can
facilitate cooperative engagement between the various stakeholders in human biobanks,
allowing their interests to be balanced flexibly with due regard to the interests of  the
donors, as well as tailoring incentives to ensure the material is used to perform research
that will benefit the public at large.
A property regime may also provide solutions in the developing world where there is
a growing recognition of  the need to protect indigenous peoples from exploitation by the
Western biotechnology industry. Native peoples have numerous concerns in relation to
medical and genetic research. First, they worry that data from such studies will be used in
a way that supports theories that conflict with theories about the origin and identity of
the group. Secondly, there is a pervasive belief  that bodily substances contain something
of  the essence of  the individual even after removal from the body, and thus there are
concerns about the possible mistreatment of  such material by researchers.164 There are
also the fears, not unique to tribal peoples, that in a small tribal group the genetic
information of  one individual may implicate others with the attendant privacy issues and,
furthermore, that the material will be exploited for material gain by the researchers
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leaving the tribe no right to share in the profits.165 Legal recognition that a tribe’s DNA
forms its communal or cultural property could effectively achieve this.166
The Human Genome Diversity project seeks to characterise the genetic diversity of
the world’s peoples. In addition, it is attractive for biotechnology companies to research
small, stable and genetically similar populations.167 There are particular issues – political,
legal and social – that these projects raise when the genomes being studied are of
indigenous peoples who are subject to economic and social disadvantage and
discrimination.168 The majority of  indigenous peoples did not develop a society where
goods are individually owned and can be bought and sold without reference to the
group.169 Land is often seen as belonging to the tribe, family or nation and cannot be sold
unless the entire group agrees, an attitude that extends to property in human bodily
materials such as DNA. While native property systems may include a ‘bundle of  rights’
that attach to land and property, these rights are phrased in terms that indicate the duties
and responsibilities that people have in relation to these properties.170 Alienability is not
a central feature of  these systems and it may not be possible to alienate many objects of
property either within the group or to persons outside it. An individual in an indigenous
culture will often not have the right to give or sell a blood sample for genetic testing
without the consent of  the group, or at all.171
Some commentators argue that informed consent procedures must be strengthened
to protect vulnerable populations, taking account of  their differing cultural traditions and
disadvantages vis-à-vis the researchers they are dealing with so as to make the consent
meaningful.172 In addition, both immediate and long-term economic and therapeutic
benefits must flow back to the groups participating in these studies.173 But there is a
contradiction here: it is arguable that the imposition of  a model of  ‘informed consent’
and ‘benefit-sharing’, even with the best of  intentions, is to impose an individualistic and
commodified model of  exchange at variance with the culture of  indigenous peoples.174
If  it is simply wrong to commodify human materials, benefit-sharing does not change this
and is more akin to ‘a bribe than justice’.175 If  we are to take the differing traditions of
indigenous cultures seriously, there must be a recognition that there is often a strong
sense that tribal DNA and biomaterials are subject to the common ownership of  the
group, and part of  its cultural identity.176 Native title claims cannot be properly
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understood or valued unless their very different conceptions of  property are understood
and accounted for.177
Rather than resorting to the ‘informed consent’ model, based as it is on the Western
individualistic idea of  personal autonomy, utilising existing property mechanisms,
including those related to common and cooperative ownership, would allow the
development of  legal tools for the protection of  vulnerable populations against
unauthorised takings of  their shared interests in their bodies and genome and as a means
to counter its appropriation and commodification by private interest.178 As tribal
property is group-orientated and has aspects of  collective and communal ownership, the
utilisation of  such legal mechanisms is particularly appropriate. In this way, the strong
exclusionary protection that is a feature of  property rights can be adapted not just to
serve the individual but also communities, ethnic groups and societies wishing to protect
their shared genetic heritage from private appropriation by third parties, as well as
ensuring that any benefits that result from the use of  their materials is returned to the
group who donated them.179
6 Conclusion
That there is an objection to recognising property in the body and its parts when it is
assumed that it serves such individualistic values is understandable. Nonetheless, this
objection fails to consider property’s complexity, its external interactions and internal
structure. Nor does it acknowledge that property is often limited by the existence of  non-
property interests that the law is accustomed to protecting. This may be due in part to the
fact that property’s communitarian aspects and the extent to which there are social
obligations inherent in property institutions have been undertheorised, a trend that is
beginning to be reversed.
Property has pre-existing mechanisms for managing and protecting communal
interests in valuable resources and could potentially provide a mechanism to protect the
interests of  individuals and communities in the use and control of  their biomaterials.
Concerns that a recognition of  property in human body parts would lead to full-liberal
ownership tend to overstate the danger. Where property rights have been recognised in
body parts, they have been limited by reference to other non-property interests, and the
trend has been away from and not towards full-liberal ownership. A recognition that
property is a complex and multifaceted institution which can develop ownership models
that are sensitive to context and the unique nature of  the resource over which property
rights are claimed strengthens the argument that a ‘property approach’ could be adopted
for the regulation of  human biomaterials in the future.
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